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Perestroika. Social Justice and Public Opinion 
In its struggle to reform, the Soviet leadership faces a major dilemma in attempting to 
reconcile economic efficiency with a commitment to social justice. The economic reforms of 
perestroika call for a greater role for market mechanisms and even private enterprise. 
However, these policies often run up against a public opinion that is staunchly egalitarian. 
Public attitudes that are, on the one hand, critical of elite privileges and distrustful of the 
state distributive apparatus are also, on the other hand, supponive of centralized distribution 
of resources, limitations on high incomes, and restrictions on private propeny. 
The issue of social justice has been revived in the last few years in the Soviet Union, 
with the encouragement of Gorbachev himself. This has stimulated a lively debate among 
intellectuals, and also touches some sensitive nerves in public opinion, which is becoming 
increasingly visible with the growth of survey research and the more widespread publication 
of its results. This creates a kind of spiral of discontent: the economy deteriorates and 
inequities increase; journalists and academics openly discuss these problems; because of this 
publicity ("glasnost"), the sense of injustice is heightened; and the regime's legitimacy is 
further reduced, not only from the declining standard of living, but from the increased 
popular consciousness of injustice. The whole phenomenon resembles the sense of relative 
deprivation and frustrated expectations which is characteristic of revolutionary situations. 
The way in which this issue is resolved, or not resolved, will determine the future shape of 
the Soviet Union. 
Justice in Communist Ideology 
The concept of justice is a tricky and slippery one in Marxist-Leninist theory, and in 
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Soviet interpretations of that theory. Marx's prolific writings are surprisingly devoid of 
references to justice, and Marxists ever since have been reluctant to employ the concept. 
For Marxists writing about capitalism, justice is an illusion, for without structural changes 
that would sweep away the system altogether, justice is unattainable in such a society. In a 
communist society, on the other hand, justice has no meaning, for the capitalist sources of 
injustice have disappeared. Robert Tucker has perhaps overstated the case in writing that 
"the ideal of distributive justice is a complete stranger in the moral universe of Marxism."' 
Others have argued that despite the explicit references to justice, Marx and Marxists "do 
have strong beliefs about justice. "2 Roy Medvedev, the formerly dissident Soviet historian 
(now a member of the Supreme Soviet) who considers himself a Marxist, has said that "the 
idea of justice and a just society was the basic stimulus for the founders of Marxism and 
their first followers. "3 
With the 1917 seizure of power in Russia by the Bolsheviks, there were a few years of 
radical egalitarianism in both policy and rhetoric. In 1918 Lenin stressed that "the 
foundations of socialism lay in the ability to distribute evenly. "4 In the early years of the 
Soviet regime, there was much emphasis on social equality and egali~anism, and a 
substantial reduction of income differentials from the tsarist period. Lenin was opposed to 
excessively high wages for anyone and favored limits on income to prohibit unlimited 
advantages in consumption or accumulation.5 
By 1921, with the retreat from "war communism" and the beginning of the "New 
Economic Policy," Lenin enunciated a more pragmatic view of justice: "when we deal with 
distribution, to think that we must distribute only fairly is wrong; we must think that 
3 
distribution is only the method. the means to raise productivity. "6 Marx had written that the 
formula for the constitution of a rommunist society was "from each according to his abilities, 
to each acrording to his needs." But he also wrote in the Critigue of the Gotha Program that 
in the first stage of communism, people would be rewarded according to their labor rather 
than needs. Lenin emphasized this latter fonnula. This utilitarian approach marked a 
rejection of the utopian notions of justice, and has dominated official Soviet thinking ever 
since. 
Through the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev years the concept of justice was rarely 
discussed. Particularly in the later years, justice seems to have been treated as something of 
a fait accompli. A 1987 booklet on Socialist Society: Its Social Justice, for example, argued 
that the "key factor in understanding the social justice of socialist society" was the transfer of 
the ownership of the means of production to the working people.7 To the extent that the 
achievements of justice were debated, it was hidden behind the issue of wages and wage 
distribution. Even the seemingly central communist concept of social equality was rarely 
mentioned during this period. Ideological reference works such as The Fundamentals of 
Communist Morality (1984) did not even mention "social equality. "8 When the broader 
issue of equality was addressed, the focus was on equality of opportunity rather than the 
equality of result. The explanation for continued social and economic inequalities was still 
based on the Leninist fonnula that differentiation was based on the quantity and quality of 
labor. The effects of such differences, however, were to be mitigated by "social 
consumption funds" in the fonn of free education and medical care, student stipends, 
pensions, subsidized holidays, and other allowances. 9 
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The Reconsideration of Social Justice 
The concept of social justice was reintroduced by two reformers, Andropov and 
Gorbachev. Andropov first used the term "social justice" in 1983, and it was frequently 
employed by both him and, after 1985, by Gorbachev. Under Andropov, and in 
Gorbachev's first years as Party leader, the concept was used as an instrument against 
official corruption and privileges. It came to have broader applications, though, in 
connection with the second half of the socialist formula "to each according to his labor:" 
against lazy and inefficient workers who received an average income; and against recipients 
of "nonlabor income." In all three of these cases-corruption and privileges, lazy workers, 
and nonlabor income-people were being rewarded by criteria that were based neither on 
need (the communist formula) or on work (the socialist one). To the extent, then, that 
justice was based on the socialist formula of distribution, people that benefitted from society 
in this way were perpetrators of injustice. 
The term "social justice" was a central concept in Gorbachev's report to the 27th 
Party Congress (in 1986), and even made a title for one of the sections of his report. Both at 
the Congress and since then, Gorbachev has frequently used the concept, though usually as a 
tool aeainst egalitarianism and "leveling." In his speech to the Congress, he illustrated the 
concept in the following way: 
when equal payments are fixed for the work of a good employee and that of a 
negligent one this is a gross violation of our principles. And first of all it is 
an intolerable distortion of socialism's basic principle: "From each according 
to his ability, to each according to his work," which expresses the substance of 
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social justice under the new social system. 10 
The Central Committee's report to the Congress asserted that "the unity of socialist society is 
by no means a leveling of social life," and stressed the necessity of "overcoming 
egalitarianism in pay, etc." But the Party was also committed to overcoming unjustifiable 
differences by expanding public consumption funds, curtailing unearned incomes "and 
attempts to use public property for selfish ends," and eliminating "unjustified differences" in 
pay. II 
The concept of social justice is two-edged; it is seen on the one hand as a key 
component of socialism, which is essentially egalitarian; but it is also directed against 
"leveling" and "egalitarianism in pay, etc." The tension within this concept reflects a 
broader tension within the whole structure of reforms in the Soviet Union: Gorbachev wants 
to achieve a more efficient, market-based economy; but this will lead to inequities, in terms 
of wider income differentials and unemployment, for example, that undermine the social 
support system that has been such an important element of the fragile legitimacy of the 
communist regime. This dilemma has stimulated a debate within the Soviet Union, and has 
led some people to challenge the reforms because of their apparent retreat from the 
egalitarian principles of socialism. With the airing of the issue of social justice by 
political leaders, academics began to develop the concept more fully, often in important 
philosophical and party journals, including Vo.prosy Filosofii and Kommunist, the party's 
monthly theoretical journal. There has been no consensus among academics, however, either 
in defining social justice or in deciding how to achieve it. Some prominent theoreticians 
have even argued that short-term inequality will lead to greater equality in the long term. 12 
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Despite the differences, there are three main elements that they seem to have in 
common. First, all writers stress that the present stage of socialism is not able to deliver full 
social and economic equality. Second, there is an effort to put distance between the concepts 
of social justice and social equality. And third, though socialist societies will have to put up 
with inequality in the short run, these inequalities can be mitigated by "social consumption 
funds." 
Efficiency over Equality 
The cause of this reassessment of ideals and ideology, as for all of the changes 
associated with perestroika, is economic. Gorbachev's economic reforms are meant to 
revitalize a stagnant Soviet economy that has been growing at only about 2 % annually for a 
decade. The economic slowdown had a deleterious effect on living standards in the country, 
which increasingly became a topic of discussion in the Soviet press. A 1988 article in 
Moskovskie Novosti (Moscow News), for example, assened that the Soviet Union now ranks 
between 50th and 60th of the world's countries in per capita consumption of goods and 
services, and that the share of government expenditures going to human needs is higher in 
the United States than in the Soviet Union!13 American estimates show annual average 
growth in consumption declining from 5% in the late 1960s to just 0.8% in the early 
1980s. 14 
This economic deterioration led party reformers to focus on creating an economy that 
is more efficient, and they see the means to this goal in creating more financial and material 
incentives for efficient and productive labor and, in the words of one sociologist, to simulate 
"the development of talents. "15 The inevitable consequence of this is the necessity to 
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Gorbachev and his advisors have increasingly recognized, and sanctioned, the fact that 
his reforms will lead to greater inequality, wealth, and materialism. In some of his earlier 
speeches on the necessity of change, the party leader addressed primarily the "macro" issues 
of efficiency and quality of production, but later began to re.cognize the "micro" issues of 
personal incentives and the accumulation of wealth. At the 27th Party Congress, for 
example, he stressed that "the size of the wages fund of enterprises must be directly linked to 
incomes from the sale of their output" and criticized workers who produce "unsuitable 
output" but still receive full wages, bonuses and other goods. "16 By 1988, however, he was 
emphasizing the micro factors of incentives at the individual level: 
We also must think about why a person in our country who has earned money 
honestly is sometimes unable to build the kind of house he wants, to buy a 
cooperative apartment or to spend his wages in some other way. The principle 
of socialism is violated in this instance, too. A gocxi toiler and his family 
should feel that honestly earned money enables them to live better.17 
Allowing people to e.arn more, of course, raises the issue of individual wealth, and 
how this accords with socialist principles. This has occasioned a lively debate in the Soviet 
press, but the dominant position seems to be a justification of wealth, as long as it is earned 
"honestly• and by hard worlc. The magazine Literatumaia Gazeta ran a series of articles 
which posed the question "Is it shameful to earn a lot?11 One point in the debate revolved 
around a study from Latvia showing that more than half of the total bank deposits were 
concentrated in just 3% of the accounts. A sociologist, V.G. Rogovin, argued that such a 
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disparity, "should not exist in a socialist society." An economist, Gennadii Lisichkin, 
responded that such a disparity was all right, and suggested that it might well be due to 
honesty, hard work, and thrift, all values that should be encouraged. He want on to speak of 
the need to "teach [pe.ople] how to make money" and praised "those healthy people who want 
not merely to receive more but to earn more. "18 Another sociologist has put the issue in 
language reminiscent of Adam Smith: "might we not hypothesize that rational calculation, 
material interests, and the striving for well-being are by no means alternatives to virtue. "19 
Soviet sociologists have pointed out that income differentiation in the Soviet Union is 
not large, citing data that shows the ratio between the 10% most highly paid to the 10% most 
poorly paid to be about 3: 1; and between the minimum and maximum wages to be about 10 
to 1. 20 According to one, increased differentiation is inevitable when profit and cost 
accounting is introduced, "but it does not contradict the principle of socialist justice despite 
the opinion of some of our philosophers and sociologists. "21 As political scientist Fyodor 
Burlatsky has put it: "you have to choose: either an active society with some kinds of 
differentiation, or a stagnant society with equality. "22 
The advocates of reform favor greater differentiation and oppose egalitarianism, but 
most also argue for restrictions at the "top," through reductions in privileges and restrictions 
on non-labor incomes, and for cushioning the impact on the "bottom" with increased social 
benefits and increases in the minimum wages. Both of these solutions, however, are difficult 
and complex ones, and often run up against the dynamics and imperatives of the market 
mechanisms which are central to the economic reforms. The issue of privileges is politically 
sensitive, in that it threatens the perquisites of the political and economic elite at all levels. 
Gorbachev and his advisors have addresse.d the issue, but not often forcefully. In fact, this 
may have been one of the factors involve.d in the 1987 dismissal from the Politburo of Boris 
Yeltsin, who at party meetings had raile.d against the "special goods" available to the elite. 2J 
Yeltsin I s populism later contribute.d to his election as President of the Russian Republic. 
The concern over "non-labor incomes" runs into a sticky wicket of economic issues. 
The struggle against such incomes, those earned outside the official economy, has been a 
prominent aspect of the campaign for social justice. Restricting these incomes is seen as a 
way to temper the accumulation of wealth that could occur with the greater differentiation 
allowed in official incomes. A prominent voice in this debate has been that of Tatiana 
ZasJavskaia, a reform minde.d sociologist who moved from Novosibirsk to Moscow after 
Gorbachev assumed the party leadership. Initially, Zaslavskaia and others identified non-
labor income with illegal income, but even before many of the reforms were implemented, ic 
was evident that the distfoction between legal and illegal incomes, or labor and non-labor 
incomes, was not always clear. The press raised questions, for example, regarding sales of 
goods in the farmers' markets, or oi handiwor~. u Gorbachev raised the issue at the 27th 
Party Congress, when he warned that "while combatting unearned incomes, we must not 
permit any shadow to fall on those who do honest work to earn a supplementary income. "2.5 
The line between labor and non-labor incomes faded even further with new laws that allow 
cooperatives and "individual labor activity." 
The issue of non-labor incomes becomes even more complicated when social scientists 
equate subsidized prices with such incomes. Tatiana Zaslavskaia, for example, has argued 
that anyone who benefits from subsidized prices is, in effect, receiving unearned income 
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which, as we have seen above, she believes should be eliminated. This leads Zaslavskaia 
and others to propose raising rents for state-owned housing and reducing subsidies, and thus 
raising prices, on meat, dairy products, and other deficit items. 26 This fits in with another 
central element of the economic reform (price rationaliz.ation), but it does muddy the issue of 
non-labor incomes which, as we have seen, in other contexts are described as illegal. 
Benefitting from subsidized prices hardly seems to be an infraction as serious as black market 
economic activities. 
The concern over excessive privileges and wealth is matched by concern with those 
who are likely to be affected negatively by the reforms. The popular and academic literature 
has addressed the issues of unemployment, of poverty, and of those living on fixed incomes. 
Fyodor Burlatsky, for example, has expressed concern over managers who talk of reducing 
their workforces by a quarter or more, when "guaranteed labor and social security constitute 
the chief gains of the socialist system. ,.-n The Soviet press has addressed the dire lot of the 
country's 58 million older citizens, more than a third of whom live on pensions of less than 
58 rubles a month. The official poverty level is 75 rubles a month; some 40 million people 
earn less than this. 28 The issue of poverty came out in the miners' strikes in Siberia and the 
Ukraine in the summer of 1989, and was one of the factors that led the government to 
increase pensions in 1990. These are difficult and expensive tasks for a government that is 
already facing a huge budget deficit. 
Such issues will become increasingly visible and acrimonious as the economic reforms 
lead to price increases, a reduction in state subsidies, and layoffs of workers. Already Soviet 
citizens are feeling the bite of such changes. Unemployment is now estimated at 6% of the 
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able-bodied population--some eight million people, and expected to double within the next 
five years. 29 The government got a preview of potential problems this past summer (1990) 
after Prime Minister Ryzhkov outlined the government's program for transition to a 
"regulated market economy. N His forecast of a doubling in retail food prices led to panic 
buying, the emptying of many Moscow grocery stores, and consequently the implementation 
of modified rationing in the capital. 
The new recognition of poveny in the country has raised another set of concerns, 
over the system of social consumption funds. The proclaimed purpose of these funds was to 
satisfy basic needs and equalize living standards through free eduction, medical care, student 
stipends, pensions, subsidized holidays and other allowances. Increasingly I however, there 
are criticisms of both the effectiveness and fairness of distribution of these resources. Some 
argue that they heavily favor the elite, and in fact do not guarantee much to the ordinary 
citizen. Sociologist Yuri Levada, for example, states that: 
in comparison with other developed countries and, more importantly, as a 
measure of the growth of our own social needs, we don't have too much, but 
rather too little real social and economic guarante.es. There are no guarante.es 
of a minimum hourly wage, a minimum standard of living, necessary medical 
services, kindergarten facilities, and so on. 30 
Levada also questions the constirutional guarante.e of employment, pointing out the lack of a 
system of instirutional guarantees through job retraining programs, information about job 
vacancies, and credits or subsidies for the unemployed. 
Others argue that the public pays a high price for the few guarantees that remain. 
Ludmilla Piiasheva, an economist who openly calls for movement toward c.apitalism, has 
written that the present system "makes everyone always needy and always dependent on the 
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state." This, she contends, "makes every citizen a petitioner for his share of social benefits 
that are not given automatically" and forces them to depend, therefore, on the benevolence 
of officials. 31 Furthermore, she argues, the social consumption fund leads to an excessive 
concentration and centralization of power, demands enormous expenditures by the state, and 
gives to the state functions "which can and should be accomplished by the citizens 
themselves." In this sphere, she continues, "the state must radically limit its power and 
panicipation, for its services are too expensive, of low quality and, as long experience has 
shown, contradict the principles of social justice. "32 Piiasheva believes that welfare 
payments should be allocated only for the needy: the disabled, elderly, and those who suffer 
from the modernization of the economy. 
The arguments for reduced social welfare,· greater differentiation and increased 
inequality have also led to a reconsideration of the concept of social classes. Already in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s writers were modifying their treatment of classes and social 
stratification. The traditional tripanite division of Soviet society into "two basic classes plus 
one stratum" was challenged by the identification of numerous additional socio-occupational 
groups or social strata. And some sociologists contend that inequality of social groups was 
characteristic of both capitalism and socialism.33 
A much more radical revision of these concepts, however, was mounted in the 1980s, 
led by the sociologist Tatiana Zaslavskaia. Zaslavskaia has bluntly challenged the Marxist-
Leninist criterion for identifying classes on the basis of their relationship to the means of 
production. She contends that other factors have to be taken into account, including "the 
extent of their executive authority and prerogatives, the economic sector in which a group 
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operates, the volume and structure of the means of production that a group puts into 
circulation, and the opportunity to use them for personal ends or to own them. "34 She has 
also called attention to the existence of group conflicts within Soviet society, though she has 
not gone so far as to refer to this as class conflict. "The driving force of behavior is 
personal and group interest," she has written. And while Soviet society may be one of 
"moral and political unity ... however, every social group has its own special interests, 
which may come into contradiction ·\,vith the interests of other groups. "35 Her colleague 
V.G. Rogovin has even said that these "contradictions" may in some cases become a 
"conflict between social interests. "36 In combination with 2.aslavskaia's broadened definition 
of social classes, this comes very close indeed to stating that there are class conflicts in 
Soviet society. 
2.aslavskaia and others recognize that these conflicts will be intensified in the process 
of refonn. In a 1987 interview, she said that "if we want ... radical changes ... there will be 
a relative change in the situation of classes, groups and strata of society, " with "advantage 
for some, ... disadvantage for others. "37 A 1988 Novosibirsk seminar on restructuring, in 
which 2.aslavskaia participated, pointed out that the refonn was bound to cause dislocations: 
"the practice of carrying out transformations here in our country and in other socialist 
countries has shown that reform cannot be both deep and 'gentle' at the same time." Among 
other things, the report recommended "an entire system of socioeconomic compensations, 
eqnalirers and shock absorbers" to cope with such problems. 38 The government has 
recognized this need; Ryzhkov's program for a market economy promised "a system of 
comprehensive social protection for the population. "39 Such concerns led Gorbachev and the 
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Supreme Soviet to opt for a modification of this plan in October 1990, rather than the more 
radical reform proposal favored by Boris Yeltsin. 
If Soviet society is to become more stratified and less gentle, the issue of justice will 
become even more acute. As the philosopher Brian Barry has written, "the problem of 
distributive justice arises only when there is a conflict of interest; it is moot when there is a 
harmony of interest. "40 Until recently, the Soviets have claimed that theirs was a 
harmonious society. With the economic reforms, however, we are likely to see increasing 
tension and conflict as some become wealthy under the new system, and others remain poor. 
The reforms are basically sacrificing harmony for efficiency. In those republics where ethnic 
issues predominate, class divisions may actually reinforce the ethnic ones. 
soviet Public Opinion and Social Justice 
So far we have discussed only the views and positions of official Soviets and scholars, 
those in positions of authority. But the issue of social justice is closely connected and 
dependent on the Soviet public, which has become increasingly vocal and feisty. The 
Gorbachev leadership has increasingly encouraged the public to speak out, and has stimulated 
new public opinion research to allow the regime to gauge popular attitudes. In some cases, 
however, especially on justice issues, the public mood runs counter to the interests of the 
reformers. 
The role of public opinion, like so much else in the Soviet Union, is undergoing 
dramatic change. During most of the years of the Soviet era, public opinion has been seen 
as "a useful and auxiliary instrument of social management"41 , but the Soviet leadership 
always resisted research that might reveal hostility to the system. During the "thaw" of the 
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Khrushchev era, more liberal public opinion studies were allowed. But even then, according 
to Boris Grushin, a prominent public opinion researcher, social scientists were like "a 
scientific council for Ghengis Khan; "42 public opinion research did not much influence the 
authorities, and substantial, revealing research was a dangerous enterprise. Gradually, most 
scientific public opinion research withered away. 
With the advent of the Gorbachev leadership, the situation changed in a radical way. 
As emigre Soviet sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh has noted, "popular attitudes in the USSR · 
can have an important impact in a period of crisis, when there is no unity at the apex of 
power, or when the leadership desperately needs the cooperation of the population. "43 The 
current period seems to be one which fits all three of Shlapentokh' s criteria for an enhanced 
role for public opinion: it is a period of crisis, there are divisions within the leadership, and 
the Gorbachev leadership is seeking popular support for its reform program. Consequently, 
public opinion research has been given a stronger role than ever before in Soviet history. 
The liberal and iconoclast sociologist from Novosibirsk, Tatiana Zaslavskaia has been 
appointed director of the All Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, established in 
1988. Other public opinion research centers have appeared as well. 44 
Zaslavskaia has argued both for more honest and sophisticated sociological research, 
and for more attention from the authorities to the needs and voices of the public. She sees 
public opinion research as a tool that is both informational and political: one that is 
necessary for the development and implementation of new policies. Management organs, she 
wrote in Pravda. "greatly need full, accurate, and truthful information about the real state of 
affairs in any sphere of social life and the requirements, interests, values and behavior of 
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social groups .... the light of sociological research must penetrate the remotest comers of 
public life, expose the accumulated dust, and stimulate the speediest possible cleaning up of 
our common house. "4s Among the kinds of questions for sociological research, she wrote, 
are "what differentiation in remuneration for work of different kinds is considered just and 
what is excessive. "46 
The public opinion surveys often reveal things that the reformers are not very happy 
about. The most problematic issues revolve around social justice. As we have seen above, 
there has been a long debate on the meaning of social justice and equality among policy-
makers and academics, and the reformers seem to have won the day with the arguments that 
egalitarianism must be tempered in the interests of economic reform and efficiency. While 
Gorbachev and his advisors may have expected resistance to these changes from 
"conservatives," they probably did not expect opposition along these lines from the public. 
Western students of the Soviet Union have recognized "the strong strand of economic 
egalitarianism" in the Soviet political culture. 47 The Gorbachev leadership may have figured 
that such egalitarianism was part of the old system of inculcated values that would easily 
wash away in the new atmosphere of openness and democratization. Public opinion surveys 
reveal that this has not happened, and that there is still strong support for egalitarianism. A 
1988 survey of Moscow residents, in asking how incomes should be distributed, found fully 
38% agreeing with the proposition that •society should strictly control incomes so that all its 
members live in approximately equal material conditions"--a quite radical egalitarian point of 
view. A larger group (48%), felt that incomes should be distributed based on the quantity 
and quality of labor, but they should not be "excessive."" In identifying various "types of 
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political consciousness". the same survey found a much higher proportion (41 % ) favoring a 
system that promoted social justice than those (I 4 % ) who favored a more pragmatic, Western 
orientation. 49 The reformers could find little comfort from these results in their efforts to 
Westernize the Soviet economy. 
What is even more surprising is how many Soviet citizens believe that even the 
existing system of distribution is unjust. In a fall 1989 urban survey on economic reform, 
only 2.5 % of the respondents agreed that the current distribution of incomes in society was 
"just" and almost two-thirds believed that the last 2-3 years had led to an increase in the 
differences between families with high incomes and those with low ones. 5° Furthermore, 
people seem to recognize that perestroika will not improve this situation. When asked "do 
you expect that perestroika will make the distribution of incomes in society more just?", 31 % 
answered "yes", 25 % thought no, and 44% were not sure. 
The public also has reservations about new forms of property relationships. A 
national survey on enterprise ownership found high degrees of support for various forms of 
collective ownership and joint ventures (71-72%), but only a minority (31 %) favoring 
privately owned enterprises (though this antipathy was primarily toward private ownership of 
heavy industry). 51 Even the new cooperatives (which are not based on private property) are 
widely distrusted, because of the high prices they charge and the high incomes enjoyed by 
their proprietors. 52 The 1989 urban sample mentioned above found only 25% approving of 
cooperatives, and 50% dis.approving.53 
Gorbachev and other leaders are fully aware of these popular perceptions, and frequently 
voice frustrations at "leveling" attitudes and the persistence of a "nonmarket psychology" in 
l8 
the population. Speaking to the Central Committee in early 1988, Gorbachev complained 
that "our understanding of social justice ha.s been defonned. 11 If we were to implement 
certain notions in the press, he said, "we would have to take up a big iron and iron out all of 
our society. Everyone would have to fit the same pattern: the gifted person and the 
untalented, the conscientious worker and the loafer, the honest man and the thief." He 
mentioned cases of productive workers who increased output manyfold, but whose wages had 
grown by "only 50-100%" But even with those increases, too small from his point of view, 
people com plain, and wony that this will lead to "private-ownership mentality. "54 
While Gorbachev may complain about these popular attitudes, he also recognizes their 
power. A striking example of this was provided in a meeting of the Central Committee in 
late 1989, when there was much discussion of the market and economic decentralization. 
During the discussion, one participant invoked the argument of the pro-market economist 
Vasilii Selyunin, saying "Selyunin argues that in a month the market would put everything in 
order." At this point, Gorbachev suddenly interrupted, saying: "I know but one thing. In 
two weeks this • market' would draw all the people into the streets and sweep away any 
government, however much it might vow fidelity to its people. "55 
There is a certain split consciousness on the issues of egalitarianism and efficiency, 
however. To some extent, the support for egalitarianism is related to popular concerns about 
the basic standa.rd of living, and about one's own material position in society. Numerous 
public opinion poUs have shown the overwhelming concern among Soviets for material 
factors: wages, housing, consumer goods, and the standard of living. This is reflected even 
in the popular perceptions of the various periods of Soviet history. In a 1989 poU of 
Leningrad residents, respondents were asked to give positive or negative evaluations of 
various periods in Soviet history (se.e Table 1) and then asked what criteria they used in 
evaluating those periods (see Table 2). 
Table I 





Late 1950s and early 19Ws [Khrushchev era] 
1964-1975 [early Brezhnev era] 
Collectivization 
Late l 970s and early 1980s 
Percentage of positive assessments 








Source: March-June 1989 survey of Leningrad citiz.ens by lhe Institute of Sociology. B.Z. 
Doktorov, "Material y k svodnomy otchetu po teme: S otsal' n ye i ekonomichesk:ie problemy 
razvitiia krupnykh gorodov,"' [Socialism and economic problems of development of large 





Criteria Used in Evaluating Historical Periods 
Criterion 
The degree of improvement of the 
material situation 
The development of the economy of 
the country 
Degree of support for the personal 
incentive of the worker 
Degree of justice in the differences 
in the material well-being of 
various strata 
The character of sacrifices required 
for development 
Rate of economic growth 
Degree of order, labor discipline 
in the country 
Hard to say 
Source: Same as Table 1 . 
Percentage of respondents citing criterion 


























First of all, it is interesting to note the relatively high assessments for the earlier 
periods of Soviet history, including the NEP period under Lenin and the period of 
"industrialiution" under Stalin. The period of the 1960s and 1970s receives much lower 
evaluations, despite the presumably more relaxed political atmosphere (compared to the 
Stalin era) and the higher standard of living. It is clear, though, that economic factors were 
high in the criteria for evaluation, and that justice ~ was not one of the most important 
factors. This suggests that there is a basically instrumental view of justice, as a means to 
achieve a higher standard of living for all. 
The public is also ambivalent, even schizophrenic, about the role of the state in 
insuring social justice. In the fall 1989 urban survey mentioned above, 63 % agreed that the 
state should interfere "as little as possible" in the distribution of incomes. At the same time, 
85 % thought that the state should "give more privileges to people with low incomes," and 
84 % agreed that the state should guarantee to each person a minimal living income. Almost 
half (48.9%) also felt that the state "should not allow excessive differences between low and 
high incomes. "56 This accords with strong lingering strain of support for firm rule in the 
country. In the same survey, about what was necessary for decisive changes in the economy, 
54 % answered, "to establish firm order in the country," and 40% favored reinforcing state 
control over prices. While the market oriented reforms called for a relaxation of state price 
controls, only 5% of this urban sample favored flexible prices, and fully 60% supported the 
rationing of scarce commodities. 57 
If Soviet citizens feel some ambivalence about the economic reforms and the tension 
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between egalitarianism and efficiency, they are categorical! y opposed to another element of 
inequality: elite privileges. This may account in part for the popularity of Boris Yeltsin, 
recently elected President of the Russian Republic. Yeltsin's populism plays on the popular 
sense of egalitarianism, which is manifested both in concern for the poor and resentment 
against the rich. At the 27th Party Congress in 1986, Yeltsin voiced complaints about the 
privileges and "special goods for leaders" and asserted that "for us, the criterion of social 
justice must always be the interests of the working class above all. .. ;s He revived these 
themes at the Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989, wondering aloud "why are tens of 
millions living below the poverty line while others are wallowing in luxury?" 59 These 
are powerful themes in the Soviet political culture, and they find a sympathetic hearing 
among many citizens. After the Congress, the All Union Center for Public Opinion 
Research conducted a poll in which they asked about Yeltsin's proposal to transform the 
fourth division of the Ministry of Health (a special division for high party and state officials) 
into medical facilities for maternal and child care. Almost everyone agreed with this; 75 % 
fully, and 16% mainly; only 2 % disagreed. 60 
The popular sense of egalitarianism is linked to an underlying support for socialism, 
and considerable distrust of both capitalism and the entrepreneurial spirit. This basic support 
for socialism has been noted by sociologists and other observers both in the Soviet Union and 
in the West. 61 It is due in part to the semi-successful propaganda that has led many Soviet 
citizens to support "the key official values and beliefs. "62 But it is also a result of the real 
success of the Soviet state in raising the standard of living and assuring most citizens of a 
basic level of security, at least up to the 1970s. As Roy Medvedev has put it, "our country 
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has achieved no mean progress in the area of individual economic, cultural and social rights 
which to all intents and purposes did not exist in tsarist Russia. "63 Despite popular fatigue 
and political apathy, there is still some degree of trust in the Soviet Communist Party. Polls 
over the last two years show a steady decline in popular trust in the Party, but in August 
1990, some 38% still expressed full or partial confidence in the organization (compared to 
42 % who did not). Given the events of 1989-90, it is difficult to know whether to be more 
surprised by the decline or by the persistence of support. 64 
Most Soviet citizens had achieved, in the 1970s, a relatively comfortable existence 
not, perhaps, in comparison with the West, which most had never seen, but in comparison 
with that of their parents or grandparents. The Soviet welfare state had provided jobs, 
housing, education, and medical care. In earlier years, Soviet sociologists had found that the 
great majority of Soviet people are satisfied with their jobs--the figures were similar to those 
in the United States.65 Even among Soviet citizens who emigrated in the 1970s, over two-
third reporte.d being satisfied with their standard of living, housing, job, and medical care in 
their last years in the Soviet Union. 66 If there were shortages of consumer goods and 
certain foods, this was largely a given, something that Russians had lived with for 
generations. From the point of view of many Soviet citizens, capitalism produced wealth, 
but it also required hard work, generated uncertainty and insecurity, and fostered inequality. 
Such perceptions pose a real obstacle to the efforts of the reformers to move the economy 
toward competition, market pricing, and greater economic and societal differentiation. 
There is, paradoxically, a possible resolution t_o this problem in the continued 
prevalence of authoritarianism in the Soviet political culture. Both Western and Soviet 
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political scientists67 have called attention to the political tradition of authoritarianism in the 
Soviet Union. Sociologist G.S. Batygin noticed this in his reading of letters addressed to 
Literaturnaya Gazeta on the issue of incomes and inequality. He noted that most authors 
"regarded unearned income as illegal income not sanctioned officially, not provided for in 
some document." Soviet citizens, then, expect the authorities to solve the problem: "mass 
consciousness puts its trust in the authorities for everything ... and it firmly believes that 
negative phenomena come from the fact that the system of administrative control has not yet 
been extended to some insignificant segment of life. "68 
Batygin deplores this situation, and sees it as an obstacle to the reforms. But the 
long-standing authoritarianism of the Soviet citizen, the tendency to look to the center for 
solutions, may well work in favor of the reforms. Before, the Soviet citizen largely accepted 
the centralized role of the state, and conceded politics to the authorities. So when the official 
ideology postulated equality and social welfare, the citizen accepted and supported that. 
Now, however, Gorbachev is reshaping the ideology, demanding hard work, legitimizing 
competition and differentiation, and giving credence to the market. If Soviet citizens 
continue past patterns of accepting from their leaders the accepted vision of the world, then 
eventually they should come around to the reformers' point of view, and be more accepting 
of these new concepts and ways of life. If they do not, the reforms will fail. 
These social and political obstacles to reform are, of course, increasingly compounded 
and complicated by the growing nationalities disputes and the step-by-step fragmentation of 
the Union. The task of bringing the population over to the market will be no less difficult in 
an environment of national conflict, political instability, and the decay of central authority. 
Gorbachev's task is a big one. He must, essentially, reshape the political culture of 
lhe Soviet Union. Samuel Barnes, in a comparative study of politics and culture, points out 
that "culture suggests the ·easy; behavior .... cultural patterns provide the routine, largely 
unexamined options followed by most people most of the time."~ Thus, for most Soviet 
citiz.ens, it was "easy" to accept the Soviet welfare state, its centralized political structure, 
and the system's undemanding work ethic. In trying to alter lhese patterns lhe Gorbachev 
leadership will have to disrupt the easy behavior of citizen compliance with them. The end 
result may be attractive, with more citizen participation and a higher standard of living, but 
the transition period will be a difficult and wrenching one for both the society and the 
leadership. 
The reforms of Gorbachev will also change the rules of the game, and, as Peter 
Hauslohner puts it, lead to "a markedly different set of prospective winners and losers than 
obtain under the rule of his predecessors. "70 The old system favored the working class, in 
terms of the material and economic benefits, at the expense of professionals and intellectuals, 
who suffered most from the restrictions on politics and information. Now the balance is 
being shifted. Gorbachev has promised greater wage differentiation, especially between 
workers and professionals, and has, in addition, satisfied the demands of many professionals 
with his policies of glasnost and democratization. Professionals are the "winners" in this 
anangement. In the working class, there may also be a new stratum of winners in those who 
capitalu.e on the new economic incentives and entrepreneurial possibilities. But probably not 
many workers fit into that category, at least not at the momenL 
The more nuanc.e.d political and sociological analyses now being conducted in the 
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Soviet Union have recognized these differentiated responses to the reforms. The 1988 
Novosibirsk seminar on restructuring categorized social groups by their attitudes to the 
reforms. Unskilled manual workers, the repon noted, are skeptical about both e.conomic and 
political refonns. Sld.lled workers suppon democratization but have a "guarded attitude" 
toward economic change. The state and economic bureaucracy are opposed to radical reform 
in both areas. Only those engaged in creative work, highly skilled specialists and high-level 
managers favor both kinds of reform. 71 This constituency is much too small to sustain lhe 
reforms over a long period, especially given the regime's encouragement of democratization 
and grass-roots political activity. Unless the state or the economy can generate some positive 
material benefits for the workers, the Kremlin is likely to confront many more of the kinds 
of strikes lhat seized Siberia and the Ukraine. Gorbachev has re.cognized this problem, 
telling the Central Committee in January 1988 that "just two or three years will decide where 
restructuring is going. "n 
Conclusions: Market Justice, Political Justice and Expectations 
Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership face multiple dilemmas in the next two or three 
years. Wilh democratization, perestroika and glasnost, they have unleashed social forces that 
will not be easy to control. Perhaps the most important problem is in managing, or 
satisfying, popular expectations. Since 1985, Gorbachev has been pledging "radical refonn" 
and even "revolutionary" changes in the Soviet Union. The refonns he promotes are me.ant 
to move the Soviet Union to a higher plain of development. For most Soviets, however, 
little has changed; indeed in many cases the marketplace has become even worse. In past 
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years, the management of expectations was not a particular problem for the Kremlin. As 
Walter Connor observed over ten years ago, "what is most remarkable about Soviet mass 
expectations is their apparent continuing modesty." He quotes Paul Hollander to the effect 
that the "key to the stability of the Soviet system lies in its management of expectations. ,m 
Gorbachev has stirred the hornet's nest by stimulating expectations without yet delivering the 
goods to satisfy them. This puts the Soviet Union in a dangerous situation. 
The basic problem for the Gorbachev leadership, then, becomes one of shifting 
popular expectations of justice from the political system to the marketplace, and then in 
getting the market to work. In a discussion of perceptions of justice in the United States, 
Robert Lane has argued that Americans prefer "market justice" to "political justice": "they 
prefer the market's criteria of earned deserts to the polity's criteria of equality and need, and 
believe that market procedures are more fair than political procedures. "74 If Gorbachev is 
going to succeed in the Soviet Union, it would seem that he would need to nudge the Soviet 
population, or a good part of it, toward this preference for market justice. As the new 
Soviet notion of "social justice" makes clear, the state will reduce its commitment to 
satisfying the norms of justice, by cutting back on its distributive role. 
This will put the regime in a dangerous position. The population as a whole has 
become increasingly dissatisfied with the political system, and with the heretofore meager 
results of economic perestroika. Groups that profited from the old arrangements, such as 
unskilled workers, bureaucrats, and collective farm workers, are especially unhappy with the 
government. Meanwhile the regime is also under fire from groups that want more radical 
reforms in respect to property and politics: skilled workers, the creative intelligentsia, some 
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high-level managers, and industrious farmers. The regime is in danger of losing all of its 
constituencies, and therefore its legitimacy. 
Under Gorbachev's reforms justice will increasingly be found through hard work and 
commitment to quality. The burden will be more on the individual. This, of course, begins 
to sound like the free enterprise system which, however, both Gorbachev and most Soviet 
citizens profess not to want. The Gorbachev leadership remains committed to socialism, and 
the population remains somewhat egalitarian and supportive of the welfare state. This 
constitutes, then, the central dilemma facing the Soviet Union: how to create a more 
efficient society without sacrificing too much of the commitment to social justice. The 
ideology of communism, the achievements of the Soviet state, and the legitimacy of the 
regime have been based in large measure on the commitment to justice. The future of the 
regime, however, depends on making the country more efficient, in terms of satisfying the 
material needs of its population and being competitive in the world market. In the tension 
between these two demands, for efficiency and justice, we see the link between the past and 
the future of the Soviet Union. 
Endnotes 
l. Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1961), pp. 18-19. 
2. G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1978), p. 12; cited in Nielsen, Marxism and the Moral Point of View (Boulder: 
Westview, 1989), p. 243. 
'.!9 
3. Roy Medvedev, "Socialism, Justice and Democracy," in Ken Coates and Fred Singleton, 
eds., The Just Society (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1977), p. 16. 
4. Vladimir Lenin, Polnoe Sobrane Sochinenie [Complete Works], (Moscow: 1967-70), vol. 
36, p. 488. 
5. V. G. Rogovi n, "Sotsial' naia spraved Ii vost' i sotsialisticheskoe rasp red lenie zhiznenny kh 
blag," [Social Justice and the Socialist Distribution of Vital Goods], Voprosy Filosofii, no. 9, 
1986, pp. 3-20; translated in Soviet Sociology. vol. 26, no. 3 (Winter 1987), p. 48. 
6. Lenin, Complete Works, vol. 43, p. 359. 
7. M.P. Mchedlov, Socialist Society: Its Social Justice (Moscow: Progress, 1987), p. 13. 
8. Vladimir Shlapentokh, Soviet Public Opinion and fdeology (New York: Praeger, 1986), 
p. 55. 
9. Mchedlov. Socialist Society. 1987, p. 23. 
10. Pravda, February 26, 1986, pp. 2-10. 
I l. Jl2ig_._ 
12. M.N. Rutkevich, "Sotsialisticheska.ia spravedlivost'" [Socialist Justice], 
30 
Sotsiologicheskie issledovania [Sociological Research], no. 3, 1986, pp. 13-25; translated in 
Soviet Sociology, vol. 26, no. 3 (Winter 1987), pp. 56-7. 
13. Moskovskiye Novosti1 August 21, 1988, p. 12; translated in Current Digest of the 
Soviet Press (hereafter CDSP), October 26, 19881 p. 27. 
14. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Soviet Economy in 1988: Gorbachev 
Changes Course (Washington, D.C, 1989), p. 41. 
15. A.G. Zdravomyslov, "Novoe sotsial'no-politicheskoe myshlenie" [The New 
Sociopolitical Thinking], Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir1 no. 6 (1987), pp. 3-15~ 
translated in Soviet Sociology, vol. 27, no. 3 ( 1988), p. 41. 
16. Cited in Rutkevich, "Socialist Justice," p. 58. 
17. In a spe.ech to the CPSU Central Committee, Pravda. January 13, 1988, pp. 1-3; 
translated in CDSP, February 10, 1988, pp. I ff. 
18. Literaturnaia Gazeta, February 19, 1986; cited in Aaron Trehub, "Social Justice and 
Economic Progress," Radio Liberty Research (RL 382/86), October 7, 1986, pp. 8-9. 
l 9. G.S. Batygin, "Dobrodetel' proliv interesa' [Virtue Against Interests], Sotsiologicheskie 
fssledovaniia. no. 3, 1987, pp. 24-36; translated in Soviet Review, vol. 30, no. 1 
(January/February, 1989), p. 36. 
20.Rogovin, "Social Justice," p. 38. 
21. Rutkevich, "Socialist Justice," p. 59. 
22. In a lecture at Stanford University, May 2, 1989. 
23. Cited in Rogovin, "Social Justice." 
24. Trehub, "Social Justice," pp. 7-8. 
25. Mikhail Gorbachev, Political Report of the CPSU Central Commiuee to the 27th Party 
31 
Congress (Moscow: Novosti, 1986), p. 59, 
26. Janet Chapman, "rncome Distribution and Social Justice in the Soviet Union, 
Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 31, No. I (1989), pp. 36-9. 
2 7. Fyodor Burlatsky, "Learn Democracy," Pravda, July 18, 1987, p. 3; translated in CDS P, 
Vol. 39, no. 29 (1987), p. 8. 
28. Esther Fein, "In Lenin's Classless Society, " New York Timesr May 7, 1989, pp. 1, 8; 
and Izvestia, August 8, 1990, pp. 1-2. Some Soviet economists suggest that a more realistic 
poverty level would be closer to 100 rubles monthly. 
29. Izvestia, April 7, 1990, p. l; translated in CDSP, May 9, 1990, p. 5. 
30. Yuri Levada, "Kakie resursy sevcxinia ischerpany?" [Which resources are exhausted'?], 
in F.M. Bonxlkin et al., eds., Posrizhenie (Understanding] (Moscow: Progress, 1989), p. 
81. 
31. L. I. Piiasheva, "Kon tury rad ikal 'noi sotsial 'noi refonny, " [Outlines of r.u:ticai economic 
reform], in Postizhenie, p. 270. 
32. .ll!..ig., p. 275. 
33. See Murray Yanowitch, Social and Economic fneguality in the Soviet Union; Six Studies 
(White Plains, N. Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1977), p. 6. 
34. Nedelya, no. 18, May 2-8, 1988, p. 11; translated in CDSP, vol. XL, no. 21 (1988), 
pp. 18-19. 
35. T. I. Zaslavskaia, ,. Sotsial 'nyi mekhanizm ekonomiki" [The Social Mechanism of the 
Economy], Znanie-sila, no. 10, 1985, pp. 3-S; translated in Soviet Sociology. vol. 26, no. 2, 
Fall 1987, pp. 35-6. 
36. Rogovin, "Social Justice," p. 30. 
31 
37. Cited in Walter Connor, Socialism's Dilemmas: State and Society in the Soviet Bloc 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 127. 
38. Nedelya. May 2-8, 1988, p. l. 
39. Pravda, May 25, 1990; translated in CDSP, June 27, 1990, p. 1 l. 
40. Cited in Robert E. Lane, "Market Justice, Political Justice," American Political Science 
Review, vol. 80, no. 2 (June 1986), p. 393. 
41. Vladimir Shlapentokh. Soviet Public Opinion and Ideo.!Qg)'. (New York: Praeger, 1986), 
p. 115. 
---i2. Boris Grushin, "Scientific Council for Ghengis Khan," Novoye Vremya, no. 43, 1988. 
43. Shlapentokh, Soviet Public Opinion, p. 131 
44. Up to now, the All Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion has been the only 
survey research organization conducting nationwide surveys in the USSR. The Center has 
conducted about two surveys per month, through some 23 regional centers in all of the 15 
republics. With the nationalities problems of the last year, however, some of these regional 
centers are no longer operating, and the scope of the "national" surveys has been reduced, 
and no longer include all of the republics. 
This raises the question of whether the Center's surveys genuinely represent the whole 
country, and in particular whether they obscure important differences among republics and 
nationalities. Researchers at the Center have responded that on most of the Center's survey 
questions discussed in lhis paper, there were not significant differences among republics. 
Nevertheless, these issues have not yet been systematically explored. 
45. Pravda, February 6, 1987; translated as "Perestroika and Sociology," Social Research, 
33 
Spring/Summer 1988, pp. 268 and 276. 
46. Ibid, p. 268. 
47. Archie Brown, "Ideology and Political Culture," in S. Bialer, ed., Politics. Society and 
Nationality Inside Gorbachev's Russia (Boulder: Westview, 1989), 31-32. As the USSR 
divides and disintegrates, a "Soviet political culture" no longer exists. But elements of that 
culture, especially economic egalitarianism, remain in much of the country, and especially 
among Russians. See, for example. Hedrick Smith's discussion of "The Russian Character" 
in The New York Times Magazine, October 28, 1990, pp. 30 ff. 
4 8. Leon tii B yrov and Nikolai L'vov, "Perestroika: JXJli ticheskoe soznanie i sotsia1 'n ye 
otnosheniia," [Perestroika: political consciousness and social relations], Vek XX i Mir 
[fwentieth Century and Peace], March 1989, pp. 15-16. Byzov is the director of the 
scientific research center of the Soviet Sociological Association, another new organization 
affiliated with the Academy of Sciences. The poll was conducted among 1231 residents of 
Moscow (half a random telephone sample and half by 1n-home interviews) in November-
December 1988). 
49. Ibid, p. 12. 
50. All Union Center far Public Opinion Research, "Otn oshenie naseleniia k radikal' noi 
ekonomicheskoi reforme," [Attitude of the population toward radical economic reform], 
Obshchestyennoe Mnenie v Tsifrakh, no. 4 (October 1989); based on a sample of 1148 
residents of 19 cities in the RSFSR and six other republics. 
51. Komsomolskaia Pravda, December 12, 1989. 
52. See Anthony Jones and William Moskoff, "New Cooperatives in the USSR," Problems 
of Communism, November-December 1989. pp. 32-5. 
53.All Union Center for Public Opinion Research, Obshchestvennoe Mnenie v Tsifrakh. 
October 1989. 
54. Pravda, January 13, 1988, pp. 1-3; translated in CDSP, February 10, 1988, p. 3. 
j5. Pravda, November 6, 1989. 
56. Same as footnote 50. 
57. These data. from the same survey mentioned above, are unpublished data from the 
archives of the National Public Opinion Research Center. 
58. Cited in Rogovin, "Social Justice," pp. 34-35. 
59. Quoted in Aaron Trehub, "The Congress of People's Deputies on Poveny," Radio 
Liberty Research, June 16, 1989, p. 6. 
60. Ogonyek, no. 34, August 1989. 
61. See, for example, Connor. Socia] ism's Di I em mas, especially pp. 71-75 and I 34-135: 
Gail Lapidus, "State and Society: Toward the Emergence of Civil Society in the Soviet 
Union," in Bialer, Politics. Society and Nationality. pp. 143-4; Shlapentokh, Soviet Public 
Opinion and Ideology. esp. pp. 4, 124; Medvedev, "Socialism, Justice and Democracy," esp. 
pp. 11-12 and 16-17. 
62. Shlapentokh, Soviet Public Opinion and fdeology, p. 4. 
63. Medvedev, "Socialism, Justice and Democracy, 11 pp. 11-12. 
64. Data based on national samples, and from the archives of the All Union Center for 
Public Opinion Research. For a report of even higher levels of trust in the party, see Lev 
Gudkov and Yuri Levada, "Kto Vperedi?", Ogonyek, no. 25, June 1990, p. I. 
65. Vladimir Shlapentolch, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People, 1989, p. 39. 
66. Brian Silver, "Political Beliefs of the Soviet Citizen," in James Millar, ed., PoJjtics, 
Work and Daily Life in the USSR; A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens (Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), p. 105. 
67. For example, Brown, "Ideology and Political Culture," pp. 18-19; and Fyodor 
Burlatsky, "Learn Democracy.·• 
68. Batygin, "Virtue against Interests," p. 31. 
69. Samuel Barnes, ''Politics and Culture," Paper presente.d at the Hoover Instirution, 
Stanford University, March 1989, p. 28. 
70. Peter Hauslohner, "Gorbachev's Social Contract,• Soviet Economy, vol. 3, no. 1 
(1987), p. 83. 
35 
71. Alebei Ulyukaev, "Restrucruring: Who's For it and who's against it?• Nedelya, May 2-
8, 1988; translated in CDSP, vol. XL, no. 21 (1988), pp. 18-19. 
72. M. Gorbachev, "Democratization is lhe essence of restructuring and the essence of 
socialism," Pravda, January 13, 1988; translated in CDSP, vol. XL, no. 2 (1988), p. 4. 
73. Connor, Socialism's Dilemmas. p. 82. 
74. Lane, "Market Justice, Political Justice," p. 387. 
